John Patty

 

Warning: getimagesize(/nfs/fs1/home_nocache/G/gov_beta/public_html/hp_uploads/jpatty_PICT0010_3.jpg) [function.getimagesize]: failed to open stream: No such file or directory in /nfs/home/G/gov_beta/public_html/homepages/index.php on line 53

John Patty

Assistant Professor of Government
[ Curriculum Vitae ]
E-mail:
Phone:
Fax:
jpatty@gov.harvard.edu
617-496-1724
617-495-0438
CGIS N406
1737 Cambridge St.
Cambridge, MA 02138
Website: http://fas.harvard.edu/~jpatty
Office Hours: By appointment. On sabbatical 2008-09.

Biographical Note:

John Patty is a formal political theorist, with interests encompassing behavioral models of decision making and political institutions. He regularly teaches "Strategic Models in Political Economy" (Government 1015) and a graduate noncooperative game theory course (Government 2005). In addition, he has taught courses on Congress, the bureaucracy, formal models in American politics, and computational modeling. His work has been published in American Journal of Political Science, Economics & Politics, Electoral Studies, Games & Economic Behavior, Journal of Politics, Journal of Theoretical Politics, Politics, Philosophy, & Economics, Public Choice, Quarterly Journal of Political Science, and Social Choice & Welfare. His current work focuses on legislative procedure, models of rhetoric, the design of bureaucratic agencies, and the formal theory of voting and elections. Professor Patty received his Ph.D. in Social Sciences from the California Institute of Technology in 2001 and was Assistant Professor of Political Economy and Decision Sciences at Carnegie Mellon University from 2000-2005.

Papers:

The House Discharge Procedure and Majoritarian Politics Journal of Politics 69(3): 678-688, 2007.
Generic Difference of Expected Vote Share and Probability of Victory Maximization Social Choice and Welfare 29(1): 149-173, 2007. (Full Title: "Generic Difference of Expected Vote Share and Probability of Victory Maximization in Simple Plurality Elections with Probabilistic Voters.")
Letting the Good Times Roll: A Theory of Voter Inference and Experimental Evidence Public Choice 130(3-4): 293-310, 2007. (with Roberto A. Weber)
Incommensurability and Issue Voting Journal of Theoretical Politics 19(2): 115-131, 2007.
The Selection of Policies for Ballot Initiatives: What Voters Can Learn from Legislative Inaction Economics and Politics 19(1): 97-121, 2007. (with Frederick J. Boehmke)
A Theory of Voting in Large Elections Games and Economic Behavior 57(1): 155-180, 2006. (with Richard D. McKelvey)
Agreeing to Fight: An Explanation of the Democratic Peace Politics, Philosophy, and Economics 5(3): 305-320, 2006. (with Roberto A. Weber)
Loss Aversion, Presidential Responsibility, and Midterm Congressional Elections Electoral Studies 25(2): 227-247, 2006.
Whose Ear to Bend: Information Sources and Venue Choice in Policy Making Quarterly Journal of Political Science 1(2): 139-169, 2006. (with Frederick J. Boehmke and Sean Gailmard)
Local Equilibrium Equivalence in Probabilistic Voting Models Games and Economic Behavior 51(2):523-536, 2005.
Equivalence of Objectives in Two Candidate Elections Public Choice 112(1):151-166, 2002.
Slackers and Zealots: Civil Service, Policy Discretion, and Bureaucratic Expertise American Journal of Political Science 51(4): 873-889, 2007. (with Sean Gailmard)
Equilibrium Party Government American Journal of Political Science 52(3): 636-655, 2008.
Arguments-Based Collective Choice Journal of Theoretical Politics, 20(4): 379-414, 2008.
The Legislative Calendar Mathematical and Computer Modelling 48 (9-10): 1590-1601. (with Elizabeth Maggie Penn)
The Structure of Heresthetical Power Journal of Theoretical Politics, Forthcoming. (with Scott Moser and Elizabeth Maggie Penn)